inaccurate understanding of the strategic implications of the treaties; the second (Result 2) is based on neglect of the facts; and the third (Result 3) is not a disagreement, since his point is one made throughout my article, including the summary. For reasons of economy of space I will refer to his results by number, and I will use his Figure 1 to detail our differences.
Result 1, or, What Happened to the Treaties?
I have claimed that in one-or two-dimensional policy space there is a curvilinear property to the EP's power. That is, if the status quo is very far from the ideal points of the members of the Council, or in the middle of them, the EP cannot make a winning proposal, whereas if the status quo is in intermediate position with respect to the Council, such a proposal may exist. Moser disputes this result and claims that the farther the status quo from the Council, the more power the agenda setter has. Let me add here what is implicit but not highlighted in my original article: If the policy space has more than two dimensions, then the farther away the status quo is from the members of the Council, the less power the agenda setter has. This statement will make my disagreement with Moser even more pronounced.
According to Moser, "Tsebelis' model implies that the Council unanimously chooses a proposal on its own in the first stage." He also claims that (in the configuration of forces depicted in his Figure 1 ) the Commission will exercise its agenda-setting power in the first round and make a proposal which is more prointegrationist than in my model, and that this proposal will be voted in the first round and cannot be upset in the second. Both claims are mistaken: I have never made the argument he attributes to me; moreover, an understanding of the strategic implications of the treaties shows that the agenda setter (whether the EP or the Commission in this case is irrelevant) is very unlikely to make Moser's proposal (although, as I will explain, under certain extreme conditions such a proposal may be possible).
My difference with Moser is located in Article 189a(1) of the Maastricht Treaty.1 It specifies in part: "Where in pursuance of the Treaty, the Council acts on a proposal from the Commission, unanimity shall be required for an I Tsebelis and Kreppel (1995) The Council can always (both in the first and second reading) modify a Commission proposal by unanimity. Consequently, when the Commission introduces proposal v, while it is true that members 3-7 prefer v to the status quo, member 3 always (by construction) prefers point z in Moser's Figure 1 to both v and the status quo. Consequently, the coalition of members 3-7 is not a stable coalition. At least one of its members (and possibly more) prefer to enter in coalition with members 1 and 2 and try to have z voted instead.
Consequently, if the Commission proposes v, the members of the Council are faced with a coordination game. They prefer v over the status quo by qualified majority, but they also unanimously prefer z over the status quo; moreover, there is no clear ordering of the alternatives v and z. Both are equilibria in this game, which means that if all other necessary members have decided to vote for v, then the missing fifth member will vote for it, and if all other necessary members are determined to vote for z, then the last member will vote for it. Therefore, on the one hand, if member 3 makes a credible commitment that s/he will only vote for z, then z will be the outcome. If, on the other hand, member 7 makes a credible commitment that s/he will only support v, then v will be the outcome. Moser assumes (mistakenly) that if v is proposed, it will be the outcome. What happens, instead, is that when the agenda setter makes a proposal of v, in fact s/he selects a lottery between v and z (and possibly, if there is no coordination, the status quo).
Is there a way of guessing which one of these two or three outcomes is more likely to occur? A game-theoretic analysis would eliminate the status quo, since it is not an equilibrium, and would predict either z or v. Furthermore, such an analysis would introduce some additional criterion for equilibrium selection (refinement).2 The standard refinements do not provide an answer in this case, but an understanding of focal points and practices established in the Council is likely to be illuminating. [Readers familiar with game theory will notice that the argument that follows is equivalent with the claim that of the two sequential equilibria (that Moser and I propose), mine is supported by the offequilibrium beliefs generated by the relevant literature (that the Council produces a unanimous decision whenever it can), while his collapses under the same set of beliefs.]
Of the three possible outcomes-the status quo (if there is no agreement), v (preferred to the status quo by a qualified majority), and z (preferred to the status quo by unanimity)-z has a focal point quality because it is always located in the middle between v and the status 2 For a word of caution against selection of equilibria on the basis of some formal criterion, see Kreps (1990 What this passage and other similar accounts indicate is that if there is a point with unanimous support (such as z) it will be selected over nonunanimous points (like v). In its absence, an informal vote will be taken, and the prevailing option will be reported as the outcome unless some state wants to report its objection. So, if the agenda setter proposes v, the most likely outcome will be a unanimous decision by the Council to select z.
Here is the logic of my article in this -simplified one-dimensional setting. If the agenda setter makes the proposal x, which the pivotal member 3 prefers over z (anything that the Council can decide by unanimity), then there is nothing that can lead 3 to defect from the coalition 3-7. Member 3 will not try to enter into coalition with 1 and 2 and upset the Commission's proposal. In other words, no alternative to x can emerge from within the Council. Consequently, when the agenda setter makes a proposal of x, in fact s/he selects the outcome x. Now let us follow the agenda setter's decision making. S/he has to select between a lottery of v and z, where z (the outcome least preferred by the agenda setter) is more likely, or a sure event x. What is s/he going to do? The odds are overwhelming in terms of policy preferences that the agenda setter will go for x (the outcome predicted in Tsebelis 1994) instead of the lottery (the outcome predicted by Moser in his comment). If one adds to the equation institutional rivalries, according to which each institution prefers to see its own proposals accepted rather than disputed and amended, the odds become even more favorable for my analysis.
The reader has undoubtedly noticed that I am speaking in terms of probabilities and have established that Moser's argument is highly unlikely. Can I establish that it is impossible? The answer is no. If the agenda setter knows that unanimity is impossible (for example, if countries 1 and 2 have different ideal points and have made clear that they will not support anything other than their own ideal points), the agenda setter can propose v 4Similar arguments can be found in Peters (1992, 84-5), Dinan (1994, 254) , and Miller (1995) . and have it accepted by the qualified majority of the Council.5 But such cases will be rare, indeed. In conclusion, the agenda setter will make the proposal x in the second round, not because there was a unanimous vote by the Council in the first round (as Moser has me claiming), but for strategic reasons, in order to prevent a unanimous decision of z in the second round.
Since the logic of my argument prevails in the second round, let us see whether the Commission can do something about that in the first round, as Moser suggests. As I have said, there is no difference in the applicability of Article 189a(1) in the first or the second round, so in the first round the outcome would have been the same. But let as assume that the Council cannot modify unanimously in the first round, in order to follow Moser's logic closely. He claims my analysis "is based on an asymmetric assumption: While the EP acts strategically in the second reading, the Commission does not use its agenda setting rights effectively in the first stage." His argument, developed in the explanation of Result 1, is that even if the outcome would have been z in the second round, the Commission will prevent it by proposing v in the first round, with the result that then v cannot be upset in the second round (members 6 and 7 would vote against such a change).
At this point Moser has the strategic analysis backwards. Even under the (counterfactual) assumptions that we have made to favor his model, the outcome still would have been x not v. The reason is that v will be voted down by member 3 in the first round, so that x will be offered in the second round and accepted by a qualified majority. The reason for that outcome is the standard backwards induction reasoning of game theory: Strategic actors can look at the end of the game and will not accept anything less in order to terminate the game earlier. 6 This point is important in order to examine Moser's claim that my analysis is either incorrect or incomplete. I have shown that Moser arrives at his results because he did not pay attention to Article 189a(1). The consequence is that his analysis is incorrect, not mine. The claims of incompleteness are also mistaken, because one has to analyze games backwards, and any (subgame perfect) equilibrium strategies in the game have to include equilibrium behavior in the last stage of the game. In other words, in order to draw conclusions about the cooperation procedure, one has to start from the second round, exactly as I did.
Moser's Result 1 is the most important theoretical disagreement between us. If correct, it would dispute not only the curvilinear property but also my whole line of argument and the concept of a conditional agenda setter. 5 I made a similar argument when I was trying to explain why European workplace health and safety regulation went outside the Pareto set of the Council (Tsebelis 1995) . Under the prevailing rules, the Council would have been able to select unanimously an outcome located in its Pareto set. Yet, if one of the countries (say, the United Kingdom) refuses for its own domestic reasons to endorse any regulation on the matter, then the Council will adopt, by qualified majority, outcomes outside its Pareto set. 6 I remind the readers with game-theoretic background that there are no time discount factors here. Indeed, the basic difference between Moser's unconditional agenda setting and my concept of conditional agenda setting is that in the first case the Council will revert to the status quo if it rejects the EP's proposal, whereas in the second case the Council has the option of reverting to a unanimously acceptable solution. This possibility significantly limits the powers of the agenda setter, whose proposal must make a qualified majority better off than any (unanimous) decision, otherwise s/he looses the agenda-setting power, which reverts to the unanimous Council. That is why I developed the concept of conditional agenda setting. Understanding the strategic implications of Article 189a (1) 7For the calculation of these numbers I assumed that there are no new EP amendments in the second round, which although mandated by the EP rules is not always followed in practice. 8 Examples that do not discuss the empirical side are Steunenberg (1994) and Crombez (1996) .
Of course, further analysis of these statistics is required.9 In my own research, analyzing the legislative history of about 90 directives and roughly 1,400 EP amendments, I found that 12% were accepted by the Council in their entirety, 11% largely (more than half the text), 10% partially (less than half the text), and 20% with modifications. In total, 53% of EP amendments were accepted and the overwhelming majority in the first round. Although we lack systematic information concerning the significance of these amendments, we do know that some were important and that some were accepted in the first round of the cooperation procedure. For example, in another article (Tsebelis 1995, 73) I enumerate EP amendments that introduced significant changes in work place health and safety; I also show that some of these were accepted in the first round. Similarly, in examining environmental legislation, Kalandrakis (1996) divided EP amendments into significant and nonsignificant and found that of the 154 amendments examined, 82 were significant; that the acceptance rates were almost identical between amendments generally and those that were significant (0.54 in the first case, and 0.50 in the second); and that the major share of acceptance occurred in the first round (0.89 for all accepted amendments, 0.91 for significant accepted amendments).
What is interesting about these numbers is that, whether drawn from statistical studies or case analyses, they all tell the same story, one that is very different from Moser's model even after the addition of his verbal corrections. Moser's model expects no amendments to be accepted (indeed, he expects that amendments will not even be made), and his verbal modifications expect that no amendments will be accepted in the first round. In reality, thousands of EP amendments are accepted, and the major part of them in the first round. Some inferences to be drawn from this story are as follows. First, the story cannot be told in one dimension.
Even if one wanted to do so," the introduction of the two-step process by the Commission introduced a second dimension (time) into the debate. The Council was obviously closer to the EP in this second dimension (time) into the debate. The Council was obviously closer to the EP in this second dimension and did not see why a two-step process would be better than straightforward adoption. This story thus directly disputes Moser's single-dimension assumption. But there is more: Under complete information, the Commission never would have made an amendment which would not be adopted and which would lead the Council to line up with the EP.12 Consequently, one single directive shows that both of Moser's fundamental assumptions are unrealistic (i.e., false). Now, I know that for some people having false assumptions is not considered a problem (Friedman 1953 Change of preferences is a mechanism that is frequently neglected in the rational choice literature because the phenomena explained take place in a short period and because its intellectual quality is trivial (it is always possible to claim that actors changed behavior because they changed their mind). In the European context, however, when legislation may take years to be completed, and the composition of different deliberative bodies may alter from the first stage to the last, change of preferences or of the status quo is a plausible explanation. Moser brings this point out very forcefully.
Moser also deserves credit because he reinstates the fact that the Commission writes the first draft of legislation and, consequently, is also a conditional agenda setter in the cooperation procedure. While it does not have de facto exclusive jurisdiction as to the subject matters to be discussed,14 it is the exclusive author of the initial proposal. In my original article I analyzed the second round and therefore did not underline this point. are to a great extent responsible for the observed outcomes, such as the speed and directions of integration. Our institutionalist approach is based on deductive reasoning for the modeling part (as opposed to simple institution) and on systematic evaluation of the facts for the empirical part (as opposed to historical accounts of single events). Space constraints prevented me from pointing out these similarities and led me to focus on the differences.15 Because our models come to sharper predictions (like points x and v in Figure 1) and are relevant to a set of facts (thousands of EP amendments), we are able to test our arguments better and present our evidence in more distinct contrast to each other than otherwise would have been the case. The extensive presentation of our disagreements, however, should not mislead the reader into the belief that they outweigh the points we have in common.
